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Abstract 
 Many biological investigations are organized around a small group of species, often referred 
to as “model organisms”, such as the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster. The terms “model” 
and “modeling” also occur in biology in association with mathematical and mechanistic 
theorizing, as in the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey dynamics. What is the relation 
between theoretical models and model organisms? Are these models in the same sense? We 
offer an account on which the two practices are shown to have different epistemic 
characters. Theoretical modeling is grounded in explicit and known analogies between 
model and target. By contrast, inferences from model organisms are empirical 
extrapolations. Often such extrapolation is based on shared ancestry, sometimes in 
conjunction with other empirical information. One implication is that such inferences are 
unique to biology, whereas theoretical models are common across many disciplines. We 
close by discussing the diversity of uses to which model organisms are put, suggesting how 
these relate to our overall account. 
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1. Introduction 
 Many biological investigations are organized around a small group of species, often 
referred to as “model organisms”, such as the bacterium Escherichia coli, the fruit fly 
Drosophila melanogaster and the house mouse, Mus musculus. Research employing these 
organisms has led to key discoveries: basic mechanisms of heredity were discovered in 
Drosophila, simple but powerful forms of gene regulation were first understood in E. coli, 
and much of our knowledge about cancer and metabolic diseases comes from work on mice. 
The terms “model” and “modeling” also occur in biology in association with mathematical 
and mechanistic theorizing, as in the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey dynamics, the 
Hodgkin-Huxley model of the action potential and the French Flag model of cellular 
differentiation. Let us call these theoretical models to distinguish them from model 
organisms. 
 What is the relation between theoretical models and model organisms? Broadly 
construed, a model is a cognitive stand in: instead of investigating the phenomenon directly, 
one studies an easier to handle alternative. In this loose sense, both Drosophila and the 
Lotka-Volterra equations serve as models.  However, we shall argue that model organisms 
and theoretical models differ substantially in epistemic character. Model organisms serve as 
samples from, or specimens of, a wider class. In contrast, theoretical models, as the name 
suggests, are constructs that serve as theoretical analogs of their targets.  
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 A number of recent authors appear to suggest, contra this view, that model organism 
research should be assimilated to theoretical modeling. Sometimes the suggestion is implicit. 
For instance, Ankeny and Leonelli ([2011]) state that model organisms can be understood 
within the “models as mediators” framework (Morgan and Morrison, [1999]), developed 
primarily to handle theoretical modeling. Similarly, in their Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy entry “Models in Science”, Frigg and Hartman ([2006]) enumerate various kinds 
of concrete theoretical models (such as scale models in engineering and electric circuit 
models in neurobiology). They refer to model organisms as a “more cutting edge” instance 
in this category. Michael Weisberg argues more explicitly that model organisms are a kind 
of concrete theoretical model, differing only in that they are not artificially constructed 
([2013], §2.5). This suggests that the status of model organisms is worth hashing out. That 
said, we accept many elements of what the aforementioned authors say about model 
organisms, and we do not wish to engage in a polemic. Therefore, we shall largely be 
concerned with our positive account. 
 Our focus is the epistemic features in virtue of which organisms (on the one hand) and 
theoretical constructs (on the other hand) serve as models. We aim to elucidate the basis 
upon which biologists make inferences from results obtained in a model to a different, 
typically broader class of phenomena.  To this end, we set aside several issues surrounding 
models. For one thing, our discussion doesn’t touch on ontological or semantic questions, 
such as what models are or how they represent. For another thing, although we rely some 
historical literature to support our claims, we do not offer a historical or sociological story 
per se. The aim is to account for the justificatory structure underlying the inferential move 
from models to targets. Moreover, our argument does not depend on the usage of ‘model’, 
‘modeling’ and kindred terms. We use the labels ‘theoretical models’ and ‘model organisms’ 
because we find them appropriate and we think they are consistent with some, but perhaps 
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not all, scientific and philosophical usage. But nothing of substance turns on how biologists, 
or philosophers, use the terms in question.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we lay out a view of theoretical modeling. 
Section 3 turns to model organisms, focusing on Drosophila. In section 4 we compare the 
two, arguing that they involve different epistemic practices. With this basic conception on 
the table, we refine the discussion in two ways. First, in section 5, we look in more depth at 
the role of phylogeny in inferences from model organisms, showing that it is a form of the 
comparative method more generally, and as such an epistemic resource that is unique to 
biology (or near enough). Section 6 expands on the picture by sketching several further roles 
of model organisms, linking them to the earlier ideas. 
 
2. Volterra and Theoretical Modeling 
 To characterize theoretical modeling we will first look at an example, the Lotka-
Volterra model of predator-prey dynamics, and then offer a more general discussion. This 
example has received significant attention in recent philosophy of biology. That, in part, is 
why we have picked it: at the risk of being unoriginal, we focus on a familiar and relatively 
uncontroversial case.   
 The applied mathematician Vito Volterra’s interest in the dynamics of predator-prey 
systems was sparked by empirical observations made by his son-in-law, Umberto 
D’Ancona, a marine biologist. During World War I, fishing in the Adriatic Sea all but 
ceased. D’Ancona discovered that, curiously, the lack of fishing seemed to advantage 
predators: right after the Great War their numbers were proportionately higher than they 
were before it. Volterra analyzed the situation mathematically, making a number of 
simplifying assumptions, e.g. that fish populations were well-mixed so that encounters 
among individuals were random. He stipulated that absent predation, prey populations 
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would grow without limit. And he treated predators as single-mindedly pursuing one kind of 
prey. However, Volterra was careful to retain several key features of real predator-prey 
relations, including, importantly, ‘[That] the proportional rate of increase of the [prey] 
species diminishes as the number of individuals of the [predator] species increases, while 
augmentation of the predator species increases with the increase of the number of 
individuals of the [prey] species’ (Volterra, [1926], 558). This property is nowadays known 
as negative coupling, and it is the core of predator-prey relations. Volterra formalized this 
setup, producing the following set of ordinary differential equations:
i
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 Equation (1) tracks the abundance of prey (V): the first term represents the prey’s 
growth rate, and the second the rate at which prey are captured by predators. Equation (2) 
tracks the abundance of predators (P): the first term represents the rate at which prey is 
“converted” into new predators, while the second the rate of predator mortality. Volterra’s 
analysis indicated that predator and prey populations exhibit distinctive, out-of-phase 
oscillations. Most significantly, it showed that killing off both predators and prey at a rate 
proportional to their abundance increases predator population while lowering prey. (In later 
work Volterra dubbed this “the Law of the Disturbance of the Averages.”) This accorded 
with D’Ancona’s observations: at the time, fishing removed both predator and prey at a rate 
proportional to their abundance. Considering the basic structural similarity between his 
model, especially the effect of fishing on a pair of negatively coupled populations, Volterra 
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concluded that the model’s results explained D’Ancona’s observations. It showed that 
‘…closure of the fishery was a form of ‘protection’, under which the voracious fishes were 
much the better and prospered accordingly, but the ordinary food-fishes, on which these are 
accustomed to prey, were worse off than before.’ (Ibid, 559). 
 Thus, Volterra constructed an idealized scenario, retaining some key structural 
features of real world fisheries. He then showed that the constructed scenario exhibited the 
phenomenon that was of interest in the real world case. The match between the real world 
phenomenon and the model, he argued, provides grounds for taking the model to capture the 
key goings-on, thus explaining D'ancona's original observation. Volterra furthermore 
believed, as he stated explicitly in several places, that any system that exhibits these basic 
structural features, would be amenable to a similar analysis.  
 Let us describe the general category of theoretical models – a term we reserve for 
work akin to Volterra’s. In this, we partly rely on the picture of modeling proposed by Peter 
Godfrey-Smith ([2006]) and Michael Weisberg ([2007], [2013]). They view modeling as an 
indirect, surrogative method of representation and analysis: in modeling, a scientist learns 
about a target system not by studying it directly, but by constructing a modified version of it, 
which retains some features while simplifying others. The model is then analyzed, and 
results about its behavior are obtained.
 ii
 Armed with an understanding of the simplified 
surrogate, the modeler then assesses whether the retained features suffice to license an 
application of the model – perhaps only in part, or only in some contexts – to the real-world 
target. Volterra’s work is a paradigmatic example of this mode of theorizing. Instead of 
describing fish populations directly, he constructed a mathematical setup, and showed that it 
exhibited stable oscillations, obeying a “law of disturbance of the averages.” He then 
reasoned that the model retained enough of the core features of his real-world target 
(Adriatic fisheries), that it could be treated as an explanation of the observations made by 
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D’Ancona. Thus, Volterra performed a kind of analogical reasoning, moving from an 
analysis of a mathematical construct, the model system, to conclusions about a different sort 
of thing: a real-world target system. 
What we are calling the model system can be an actual concrete object, but is more often a 
set of mathematical equations or a hypothetical mechanism. In either case, the model is a 
construct insofar as its properties are either wholly stipulated or specified so as to represent 
some target. Its elements and their arrangement are chosen by the modeler, who makes 
simplifying assumptions and idealizations in the process. One upshot of the model’s 
constructed nature is the modeler’s intimate knowledge of, and high degree of control over, 
its makeup. This makes its study easy compared to the target system.  Furthermore, intimate 
acquaintance with the model guides the modeler in assessing model-target inferences. 
Volterra, for instance, knew that negative coupling was a crucial aspect of his model, and 
that was a key reason why he focused on this feature when applying his theoretical findings.  
 In sum, theoretical modeling involves a mathematical or mechanistic construct that 
serves as an analog of the target. The modeler analyzes the model and then assesses whether 
the target is sufficiently analogous to it. If successful, this analysis licenses conclusions 
about the target, on the basis of results concerning the model.  
 
3. Drosophila as a model organism 
 Can this picture of theoretical modeling encompass model organisms? We hold that in 
key epistemic respects it cannot. Rather, we suggest that inferences from work on model 
organisms are empirical extrapolations, whereby biologists treat the organism as a 
representative specimen of a broader class.
iii
 Our discussion proceeds in two steps. First, we 
describe the general features of model organism research, drawing on historical work. Then, 
in the next section, we look into the epistemic basis for model organism-based inferences.  
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We focus on Drosophila throughout, but also allude to other examples to highlight certain 
points.  
 The fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster is a central model organism in genetics and 
developmental biology. It rose to prominence in the first decades of the 20
th
 century, through 
the work of Thomas Hunt Morgan and his group at Columbia University (later at Cal Tech). 
During the middle third of the 20
th
 century its centrality to biological research waned 
somewhat, but as molecular genetics emerged, especially in the 1970s, the fruit fly came to 
re-occupy center stage (Keller, [1996]; Weber, [2007]). Both periods are relevant for our 
analysis. Work on Drosophila enabled the Morgan group to identify and characterize the 
phenomenon of genetic linkage and to develop chromosomal mapping. More generally it led 
to the articulation of, and lent initial support for, the chromosome theory as a mechanistic 
explanation for Mendel’s rules and for the all-important exceptions to them. Drosophila was 
suited for work in the lab because its size and short generation time enabled the maintenance 
of large lab populations and allowed the observation of many cycles of reproduction and 
inheritance.
iv
 Extra-biological reasons may have also played a role, such as the match 
between its seasonal life-cycle and the academic calendar (Kohler, [1994]).  The fruit fly’s 
centrality was cemented as further useful features were discovered, such as the giant 
chromosomes in its salivary gland. 
 Morgan and his students initially collected flies in the wild (i.e. the window sill or the 
backyard, as fruit flies live in close quarters with humans). But within a few years most flies 
were lab reared, as is true today. To enhance reproducibility and allow for easier 
comparisons, strains of interest were isolated, bred and standardized in the lab. In time, fruit 
fly genetics were deliberately modified to generate strains that were better suited for lab 
work – more viable, easier to score, simpler to cross etc. Morgan and his colleagues 
developed an array of experimental tools for working with Drosophila, from specialized 
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tubes and bottles to crossing schemes. Later workers perfected these tools, and expanded the 
toolkit. Nowadays virtually any gene in the fruit fly can be expressed at a specific stage and 
location, and gene expression patterns can be monitored in detail. More generally, the range 
and precision of available techniques for manipulating cellular and molecular structures in 
Drosophila (especially melanogaster) is greater than for almost all other species.  
 From the early days, work on Drosophila has been regarded as a basis for claims 
about other organisms. Morgan and his group treated their findings as applicable to a vast 
range of species – including moths, pigeons, cats, silkworms, rabbits, and several species of 
plants (e.g. Morgan et al. [1915]). They did not, in any text we know of, offer detailed 
statements about scope, but they make clear that they view results obtained in flies as 
indicative of the basic mechanisms of Mendelian heredity in a wide variety of organisms, 
perhaps all sexual species
v
. This judgment, with respect to Drosophila as well as other 
model organisms, is echoed by more recent biologists. As a recent genetics textbook puts it:  
 
The science of genetics discussed in this book is meant to provide an 
understanding of features of inheritance and development that are 
characteristic of organisms in general. Some of these features, especially 
at the molecular level, are true of all known living forms… [S]o we do 
not have to investigate the basic phenomena of genetics over and over 
again for every species. In fact, all the phenomena of genetics have been 
investigated by experiments on a small number of species, model 
organisms, whose genetic mechanisms are common either to all species 
or to a large group of related organisms. (Griffiths et al., [2008], p. 17) 
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 To summarize: Model organisms begin their career by being collected from the wild, 
typically because they are easy to rear and convenient for the research at hand. Once brought 
into the lab, a model organism typically undergoes a process of genetic standardization and 
over time an intricate array of experimental tools and methods are developed. Finally, and 
(for our purposes) most importantly, results from experiments on model organisms tend to 
serve as bases for conclusions about other organisms; sometimes, as in the case of early 
studies in Drosophila, results are seen as very widely applicable – even as far as to all 
sexually reproducing organisms.   
 
4. Generalizing from work on a model organisms 
 We now wish to argue that model organisms diverge epistemically from theoretical 
models. Theoretical models like Volterra’s are idealized constructions, specified for analogy 
with a chosen target. Model organisms, in contrast, are drawn from a wild population. As we 
have noted, they typically undergo standardization and modification. But they are still 
treated by biologists, in most cases, not as artificial constructs but as members of the class of 
objects (i.e. organisms) under investigation (Weber, [2005]). The fact that an object is a 
member of a broader class, however, doesn’t yet justify generalizing from it to other 
members of the class. How are findings from model organisms applied to other organisms? 
We consider three routes. One option is to look at the target organism directly, and 
investigate whether it has the feature first found in the model organism.
vi
 This is a common 
practice in molecular genetics, where researchers try to ascertain whether a DNA sequence 
discovered in one organism occurs in other organisms and, if so, whether it exhibits the 
same activity. But here, the model organism isn’t serving as a basis for inference about other 
organisms: it does not serve as an epistemic stand in, but as a guide for what to look for. 
Thus this is not a kind of modeling in the relevant sense. 
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 Another, more model-like way in which a result from one organism may be 
generalized is via “circumstantial” evidence. Here one knows, with respect to some broad 
and/or partial features, that the model resembles some target range of organisms. From this, 
it is concluded that a specific finding in the model is likely to hold in the target range. For 
example, one of the most celebrated results in neuroscience is Alan Hodgkin and Andrew 
Huxley’s discovery of the mechanism of the action potential ([1952]).  In a nutshell, they 
showed that action potentials result from a specific chain of molecular events, wherein the 
neuron’s permeability to ions of sodium and potassium rises and falls in turn. Hodgkin and 
Huxley’s experimental work was done primarily in the giant axon of the common Atlantic 
squid (Loligo paelleii), a central model organism in neurophysiology.  It had been 
previously shown that sodium and potassium have similar effects in neurons from various 
other organisms – including cuttlefish, frogs, mammalian hearts, algae and crustaceans. 
These results did not prove that action potentials worked similarly across these organisms, 
but, as Hodgkin and Huxley put it, ‘…the similarity of the effects of changing the 
concentrations of sodium and potassium on the resting and action potentials of many 
excitable tissues (Hodgkin, [1951]) suggests that the basic mechanism of conduction may be 
the same as implied by our equations…’ ([1952], p. 542).vii  
 In this type of inference, the model organism fulfills a stand-in role of sorts. A coarse-
grained uniformity across a range of organisms, coupled to a specific result from the model 
organism, are jointly taken to imply that the specific result from the model is likely to hold 
more broadly. Here, the model organism is treated as a specimen, and what we have called 
circumstantial evidence justifies treating it as representative of a broader class. In other 
words, such circumstantial evidence suggests that a certain range of organisms (including 
the model) is sufficiently uniform so that results obtained in the model can be generalized to 
the class as a whole. 
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 A third way in which model organism generalizations are justified is via phylogeny. 
The basic rationale, to quote a central cell biology textbook, is that “because genes and gene 
functions have been so highly conserved throughout evolution, the study of less complex 
model organisms reveals critical information about similar genes and processes in humans.” 
(Alberts et al., [2008], p. 556). This method is perhaps the most model-like of those 
discussed so far, and more importantly, it is distinctively biological. We expand on it, and on 
the broader method to which it belongs, in the next section. Here we provide a summary. 
 In a phylogeny-based generalization results from a species are extrapolated on the 
basis of evolutionary relatedness. This inference is guided by the assumption – or at least the 
hope – that creatures in the broader class, i.e. on the relevant portion of the phylogenetic 
tree, have retained the relevant features from their common ancestor. This inference also 
treats the model organism as a specimen, but the specimen’s representativeness is justified 
via an assumption about the evolutionary history of the model and target. Information about 
relevant casual and behavioral similarities is replaced by an appeal to shared ancestry. 
The extent to which one can generalize on the basis of phylogeny is often difficult to 
ascertain, because of uncertainty both about relatedness and about the conservation of 
features. For these reasons, biologists often refrain from specifying the exact scope of 
generalizations from model organisms. It is usually safe to assume that the more basic a 
feature or mechanism is – in physiological and/or developmental terms – the less likely it 
is to change in the course of evolution
viii
, and the more likely it is that results pertaining to 
it in one organism may generalize beyond it
ix. This was the case with Morgan’s work on 
key aspects of inheritance in sexual species. Alberts et al. make the point with respect to 
work on the cell-cycle in the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans:  
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Although the worm has a body plan very different from our own, the 
conservation of biological mechanisms has been sufficient for the worm 
to be a model for many of the developmental and cell-biological 
processes that occur in the human body. Studies of the worm help us to 
understand, for example, the programs of cell division and cell death that 
determine the numbers of cells in the body—a topic of great importance 
in developmental biology and cancer research. ([2008], p. 37). 
 
 The two model-like inference patterns that we have discussed are a form of empirical 
generalization. In this respect, model organisms serve as bases for induction – specifically, 
they serve as bases for extrapolation from a specimen to a broader class. In both 
circumstantial evidence based inference and phylogeny based inference, the move from 
model to target is grounded in information pertaining to the representativeness of the 
specimen. Note that these methods are not mutually exclusive. Indeed they are commonly 
employed synergistically. This occurs when both circumstantial evidence and information 
about shared ancestry are available – and together these jointly support (and make specific) 
the projection from model organism to target.  
 In sum, we suggest that results from organisms can serve as bases of inference in one 
of two ways. The first involves an appeal to circumstantial evidence, so as to generalize to 
the likely applicability of the result in the range of cases for which there is such evidence.  
Alternatively (but not exclusively) the move to the target may be grounded in the 
phylogenetic relatedness of the model organism and the target range. These two forms of 
inference are broadly model-like. But they diverge in their epistemic roles from theoretical 
models. The type of stand in at issue is different. In theoretical modeling, model-target 
inferences are grounded in an explicit procedure of feature-matching. In model organism 
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work, the inference from model to target is mediated via indirect evidence about the 
similarity of members of the broader class of organisms to which both model and target 
belong. One kind of indirect evidence is what we have called circumstantial evidence, the 
other is shared phylogeny. This latter form of inference is distinctively biological, and we 
think it sets apart model organism work from other kinds of theoretical methods. We expand 
on this point in the next section. 
 
5. Phylogenetic inference and model organisms 
We believe model organism work is part of a distinctive class of biological inference 
strategies, known as the comparative method. While theoretical models are assessed for 
structural resemblance to real world targets, biologists engaging in the comparative method 
gain epistemic traction through ancestral relations. We sketch the comparative method and 
illustrate it, using an example that does not involve a model organism. Afterwards, we argue 
that model organism work has the same general form.  
The Darwinian insight that all life is ancestrally related is at the heart of the 
comparative method. We can conceptualize ancestral relations between organismic traits as 
either homologous or homoplastic. Homologous relationships are those of common descent: 
the ancestor of the two lineages had that trait, and its descendants have inherited it. 
Homoplastic traits, by contrast, evolved independently – the common ancestor did not have 
the trait
x
. By comparing different lineages biologists can infer ancestral relationships (Sober 
[1988a]), frame and support adaptive explanations (Currie, [2012]; Griffiths, [1996]; 
Sansom, [2003]), infer unknown characters (see below), set molecular clocks (Ayala [2009]) 
and detect large-scale patterns in life’s shape. A concrete case illustrates phylogenetic 
inferences. 
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The comparative method is often used to infer unknown traits. This is most prominent 
in paleontology, where the incompleteness of the fossil record necessitates reliance on 
inference from contemporary critters to access extinct lineages. Some extant animals present 
similar difficulties. The Colossal Squid Mesonychoteuthis hamiltoni, for instance, is both 
rare and lives in a high-pressure deep sea environment, making direct study next to 
impossible. In particular, its feeding behavior is a mystery. Biologists infer the behavior of 
colossal squid from organisms which they can access: that of closely related, smaller, and 
common squid living closer to the surface.  
Mesonychoteunthis Hamiltoni has a fearsome reputation: the world’s heaviest 
invertebrate at around half a ton, sporting the largest eyes and beak of any cephalopod. It is 
tempting to view them as dynamic, fast-moving, chase-and-kill predators. Rosa and Seibel 
([2010]), however, argue that the Colossal Squid is not suited to the chase, and suggest that 
‘… it is, rather, an ambush or sit-and-float predator that uses the hooks on its arms and 
tentacles to ensnare prey that unwittingly approach.’ (p. 1376). We are not here concerned 
with the success or otherwise of their argument, but rather draw on their paper to illustrate 
phylogenetic inference. Rosa and Seibel’s argument has two parts: first, they estimate the 
squid’s metabolic rate in order to work out its daily prey requirement; second, they compare 
the Colossal Squid’s daily prey requirement to that of other lineages which occupy a high-
speed predatory niche. Each step involves a different use of the comparative method: the 
first is based on phylogeny, as in standard model organism work; the second infers between 
ecotypes. We focus on the first part as an example of a non-model organism application of 
the comparative method. 
There are no live specimens of colossal squid available to directly measure metabolic 
rates. Fortunately, the Cranchiidae (Cranch) family includes smaller, more accessible 
lineages on which we do have metabolic information. Rosa and Seibel estimated the 
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metabolic rate of Colossal squid from measurements in Cranch squids of four size 
magnitudes. Relying on a general metabolic model they were able to estimate the rate of 
metabolism in Colossal Squid and compare it to other large squid such as the Giant 
(Architeuthis) and Jumbo (Dosidicus gigas). This suggested that the Colossal Squid requires 
far less food than other top predators of the southern oceans. This discrepancy led Rosa and 
Seibel to hypothesize a much more sedentary lifestyle for the Colossal Squid than both its 
smaller relatives and top predators in the sub-Antarctic oceans. 
In inferring the metabolic rate and daily prey requirements of Colossal Squid, Rosa 
and Seibel perform a phylogenetic inference. The inference is in two steps. First, the trait of 
interest (in this case metabolic rate) is examined in one or more closely related lineages. 
Because Cranchiidae share a common ancestor, it is thought that traits held commonly 
among that clade were most likely also held by their common ancestor. The first step, then, 
is a retrodiction from contemporary lineages to the common ancestor of those lineages. The 
second step projects from the common ancestor to the target – in this case the Colossal 
Squid. It is thought that any trait held by a relatively recent ancestor, or a trait which is 
relatively entrenched, is likely to be retained in a contemporary lineage. By examining 
relatives, biologists postulate a regularity across the clade in question, maintained due to 
common descent. In Rosa & Seibel’s case, the inference is also mediated via a metabolic 
model, but this is not always the case. 
 
Figure 1 here 
Figure 1 caption here 
 
The colossal squid is not a model organism – and this is partly why we have chosen to 
discuss this example. The pattern of phylogenetic inference is, we submit, the same pattern 
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seen in standard model organism cases. Just as Morgan took Drosophila to be a 
representative sample of the basic genetics of sexual organisms, so Rosa and Seibel take 
accessible members of the Cranchiidae to be a good sample of that clade metabolically. In 
both cases the justification for the inference is not based on a direct comparison of known 
features, but rather on ancestry. The details – such as the kind of trait in question and the 
recency of the relevant common ancestor – differ, but the strategy is the same: the 
relatedness of the lineages licenses inferring from one to another, without the need to 
explicitly compare the underlying traits. Standard use of model organisms, then, is best 
understood as an application of phylogenetic inference. 
Moreover, some criticisms of modern biology’s reliance on model organisms can be 
understood in light of our discussion. For instance, Bolker and Raff ([1997]) argue that 
because model organisms are chosen, in part, on the basis of experimental tractability, they 
tend not to exhibit common features of the living world essential to its understanding, such 
as complex life cycles and certain forms of phenotypic plasticity. The claim, in essence, is 
that experimental considerations bias the choice of model organisms. Our discussion brings 
out the problem. Since model organisms serve as specimens, a bias in the criteria for 
specimen choice will affect the scope of consequent findings; they will apply only to a 
subset of extant lineages. Another kind of critique has been voiced by some microbiologists, 
who argue that extensive horizontal gene transfer (HGT), in model micro-organisms 
(especially bacteria such as E. coli) undermine generalizations across unicellular organisms. 
This is in contrast to inferences in multicellular creatures where HGT doesn’t occur. Again, 
this dovetails with our discussion. To put it very briefly, HGT confounds attempts to identify 
bacterial lineages.
xi
 For this reason, it poses serious challenges to the use of the comparative 
method, including inferences from model organisms.  
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In the next section we broaden the picture and consider additional functions played by 
model organisms. But before doing so let us note the place of phylogenetic inference in 
biology as a whole, as this reveals a further discrepancy between model organism work and 
theoretical models: while the latter practice exists in many parts of science, the former is 
particular to biology. 
Phylogenetic inferences are made on the basis of common causes. A common cause 
explanation works on the assumption that a hypothesis about the past which unifies the most 
contemporary evidence is more likely than one which doesn’t (Reichenbach [1956], Cleland 
[2011]). Contemporary philosophers have emphasized the role of common causes in 
historical inferences. Some (particularly Sober [1988b] and Tucker [2011]) argue that this 
inferential structure does not come for free: what licenses the assumption that contemporary 
events are likely to have common causes? After all, the world is a complex place, and it is 
not obvious that we should expect such uniformity. 
Grounding common causes in phylogeny – where it can be established – meets this 
challenge. Morgan et al. had license to assume that most sexual organisms are genetically 
alike, and Rosa & Seibel have good reason to believe that metabolic rates are extrapolatable 
across Cranch squid. Both are justified by evolutionary theory. The high-fidelity cross-
generational transmission of traits central to heredity leads us to expect a certain 
phylogenetic ‘inertia’ – often, a trait present in some past lineage will be inherited by its 
ancestors. Rates of inertia and the kind of traits involved will differ, and this will matter 
greatly to the kinds of inferences that common ancestry licenses, as well as their certitude 
(Sober [1988b]). But the underlying point still holds: shared ancestry serves as a basis for 
inferences as it is a common cause of traits across related taxa. These sorts of inferences 
have a special role in biology, because of their grounding in evolutionary theory
xii
. 
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This justification, particular as it is to biological theory, stands in sharp contrast to the 
generality of the theoretical modeler’s strategy: the use of analogical reasoning is 
widespread in biology but is, if anything, more common the physical sciences, in economics 
and a variety of other disciplines. Thus, phylogenetic inference, including model organism 
work, is distinct from theoretical modeling both in its justificatory structure and its domain. 
 
6. Further roles of model organisms  
 Our focus in this paper is on the sense in which model organisms are models, i.e. in 
their epistemic stand-in role in biological practice. We have argued that this role is best 
understood in terms of empirical extrapolation, as a form of the comparative method. 
However, we do not wish to claim that the forgoing discussion is exhaustive: model 
organisms serve other important roles, epistemic and otherwise. Indeed we believe that 
properly understanding the work we have discussed requires situating it with respect to these 
other roles. That is the goal of this penultimate section. 
 6.1. Preparative experimentation. The importance of model organisms to biological 
research is due in large measure to their amenability to experiment. To some extent, this is 
because of natural biological properties, such as small size, short life-cycle and ease of 
adjustment to life in the lab. But many decades of work on model organisms have greatly 
contributed to their suitability to research, in providing crucial background information for 
designing and interpreting experiments, and ever more sophisticated methods of detection 
and analysis. Weber ([2005], §6.6) calls this “preparative experimentation”. As he explains, 
“this kind of experimental work is not directly aimed at testing a specific hypothesis, nor do 
biologists necessarily need a guiding theory for conducting this kind of research. This does 
not mean that they do not need any theoretical knowledge. Clearly, developing experimental 
organisms and other research materials requires some knowledge of genetic mechanisms, 
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chemical properties of biomolecules such as DNA or protein, and so on.” (Ibid, p. 174). As 
Weber shows, decades of classical genetic research on Drosophila, flowing from the work 
of Morgan and his colleges, provided knowledge about mechanisms of inheritance, but also 
material resources, such as methods for rearing, breeding, and genetically modifying the 
organism, strains with specific mutations that may be used as controls and/or as markers and 
cloned DNA fragments that serve as vectors and for detection purposes. These resources 
contribute to the entrenchment of a model organism within a research community, as they 
make future work on it easier and potentially more productive. To Weber’s discussion we 
might also add that oftentimes, methods first developed in one model organism are exported 
to other experimental organisms. For instance, the UAS-GAL4 system, a powerful method 
for targeted gene expression first developed in Drosophila (Brand and Perrimon, 1993) has 
been extended for use in other organisms, including the frog Xenopus laevis, Zebrafish 
(Danio rerio) and mice.   
 Preparative experimentation isn’t in itself model-like in character. It is empirical or 
methodological work aimed at facilitating future research.
xiii
 However, it may contribute to 
the generalizability of model organisms in at least two ways. First, the more able scientists 
are to make discoveries about model organisms, the more material for potential for 
extrapolation there is. Secondly, when methods developed in a model organism are exported 
for use in other organisms this may not only enhance research in the organisms to which the 
method has been extended but also, at least in some cases, makes such work more 
comparable across species – partially controlling for differences in methodology – thus 
enhancing generalizability.  
 6.2. Model organisms as paradigms. Model organisms could be loosely described 
using Kuhn’s notion of a paradigm resultxiv. A paradigm result serves as an exemplary piece 
of science, guiding future researchers’ expectations and standards of evaluation. It sets the 
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bar for best scientific practice. Thus, the early (and successful) effort in sequencing the 
model bacterium E. coli (Blattner et al., [1997]) was, among other things, a paradigm for 
future and ongoing sequencing projects. It helped set standards for what counted as 
sufficient genome coverage, and it facilitated the development of methods for parsing 
sequence data and organizing and presenting results.  
 This paradigm-result-role gives rise to methodological and epistemic standards. In a 
loose sense, paradigm results serve as a model for how to do science. This sense of ‘model’ 
may be quite different than our previous usage, so we employ it cautiously. It appears rather 
indirectly related to the role of model organisms in grounding biological generalizations.  
 6.3. Model organisms as theoretical models. We have distinguished between target-
to-model inferences in theoretical modeling versus model organisms. The distinction 
concerns justificatory structure and not ontic character. For all we’ve said, there is nothing to 
block the use of an organism as a theoretical model. Recall that a theoretical model, as we 
use the term, serves as an analog or surrogate. Theoretical models often consist of 
mathematical equations, as in the Lotka-Volterra case. But models can be concrete objects, 
such as Watson and Crick’s well-known wire-and-metal-sheets model of DNA. To serve as 
a model, a concrete object need not be manmade; it can be an organism. 
 Experimental evolution contains an important class of such cases. In Wade’s ([1977]) 
study of the dynamics of group versus individual selection he subjected populations of flour 
beetles to different selection regimens, some of which favored group selection whereas 
others favored selection at the individual level. Or, more recently, Ratcliff et. al ([2012]) 
subjected yeast to selection pressures that favor increasing size, thus inducing the formation 
of many-celled clumps. This, they argue, amounts to the de novo evolution of 
multicelularity. In such cases it is clear that working with organisms isn’t a means for 
generalization over related taxa. Wade did not take his results to apply in any special way to 
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beetles or insects, nor do Ratcliff et. al view their work as specially pertinent to yeast or to 
related microorganisms.
xv
 Rather it is a form of theoretical modeling, where the model is a 
whole organism or even a population of organisms, which serve as a surrogate for wild 
organisms and populations, either in the past, over extended temporal or spatial scales, or in 
difficult-to-study locations and conditions. 
 To be sure, there are differences between modeling that utilizes concrete objects, 
organisms in particular, and mathematical or other abstract models. It might be said, for 
instance, that working with actual organisms provides results with a kind of “proof of 
concept” status, which mathematical theorizing cannot obtain (Crone & Molofksy [1999]; 
Odenbaugh [2006]). Perhaps so, but this is consistent with thinking that both kinds of cases 
are exercises in theoretical modeling. The broader and more important point is that a 
scientific study using a model which happens to be an organism doesn’t suffice to make it a 
model-organism based study in the presently relevant sense. An organism can serve as a 
vehicle for theoretical modeling.  
 6.4. Inspiration for engineers. A role played by model organisms which is less 
internal to biology is guidance and inspiration for engineers.
xvi
 For example, Ma and 
colleagues ([2013]) designed a flapping-wing insect-sized robot. Their design was inspired 
by studies on flight related morphology and behavior in flies, especially Drosophila 
melanogaster. It is possible to describe this sort of work in terms of modeling (Ma et al. 
state that their robot was ‘…modeled loosely on the morphology of flies.’, Ibid, p. 603). Yet 
the role played by knowledge about Drosophila in this context is clearly different than the 
role it played in, say, the Morgan group’s research. Most obviously, biologically inspired 
engineers need not aim for an understanding of the inspirational phenomenon, but rather 
look to construct an artificial device. That said, there can be a special role for model 
organisms in this context, because of the vast knowledge that exists about their biology. 
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Moreover, the construction of engineering models may feed back into our understanding of 
animals–constructing robots to mimic animal behavior, for instance.   
 6.5. Anchoring a research community. Finally, stepping outside of our 
epistemological focus, model organisms typically serve to anchor a scientific community. 
Several authors, both philosophers (e.g. Ankney and Leonelli, [2011]) as well as scientists 
(Griffiths et al., [2008], 759) view this as a central aspect distinguishing model organisms 
from other experimental organisms. It has been suggested that a community devoted to 
studying a particular model organism will tend to converge more closely on methods and 
standards of evaluation, and develop more extensive infrastructure, such as stock centers and 
databases. Such a community will also tend to follow specific, often tighter norms for 
participation in community-level activities and collaborative research, sharing of resources 
(such as stocks and tools) and distribution of data. 
 These and other features of model organism based communities do not follow from 
the epistemic roles model organisms play. But one can readily see that the epistemic features 
we have discussed both raise the need for, and support, a strong research community. The 
development and deployment of tools and methods is aided by collaboration. The ability to 
generalize from a result obtained in a model organism depends, in the ways we have 
discussed, on background information, which is easier to obtain when there is a supporting 
community structure, and when the outputs of its use can readily feed into future research. 
Thus, while we do not take a specific stand on how or to what extent model organisms 
anchor research communities, we believe that our discussion of the epistemology of model 
organisms can help explain the need for and the fruits of such communities, when they exist.  
 
7. Conclusion 
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 We have argued that model organisms are not theoretical models. While in a very 
broad sense both involve the use of tractable stand ins, these two strategies have distinct 
justificatory structures. Theoretical modeling is characteristically analogical: the modeler 
moves from a model to target on the basis of explicit and known features that they share. 
Model organisms, by contrast, are used as representatives of a broader class, justified either 
via “circumstantial” evidence or via phylogeny. There is also a difference in scope: while 
theoretical modeling occurs all over science, model organism inferences, especially when 
they are grounded in phylogeny, are restricted to biology.  
 Some may accept these arguments, but prefer to group theoretical models and model 
organisms under a common heading. As we discussed in section 6, model organisms play 
varied epistemic roles. It is not obvious which criteria to employ when deciding how to draw 
category boundaries in this kind of context. To our minds, it is a mistake to lump empirical 
extrapolation, such as those performed by Morgan and other biologists drawing on model 
organisms, with theoretical ones, like those performed by Volterra. We also think it helpful 
to set apart, where appropriate, the epistemic strategies characteristic of different parts of 
science. For these reasons, we favor a rather sharp demarcation between model organisms 
and theoretical models 
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i
 Volterra published his results in Nature in 1926. Unbeknownst to him, the American 
chemist and demographer Alfred Lotka had come up with essentially the same model in 1925 
– hence the current label. We focus here on Volterra’s work, because Lotka’s was part of a 
grander project, attempting to systematize much of ecology and population biology 
(Kingsland, [1985]). Volterra’s goal, at least initially, was more circumscribed, and, we think, 
more clearly an episode of model-based science. (Kingsland, [1985]) 
ii
 The ontological status of models is a complex question (Levy, [forthcoming], Thomson-
Jones, [2010]). As noted earlier, our arguments do not depend on assumptions regarding 
ontology. At some points we speak of models as if they were objects of sorts – constructed 
and compared with empirical systems – but that is no more than a faҫon de parler. 
iii
 Some philosophers use ‘extrapolation’ broadly to capture all manner of empirical 
inferences. We use the term more narrowly. In statistics and related areas, ‘extrapolation’ 
(and the closely related notion of ‘interpolation’) typically refers to an estimate of the 
relationship between two variables that moves from an interval in which their values have 
been observed to a larger interval in which they haven’t. Our usage is close to this statistical 
notion, although we do not restrict it to the estimation of quantitative traits by specific 
statistical methods. On this usage, enumerative induction – in which one uses a sample in 
order to infer how common a certain type is within a given class (“How many Fs are Gs?”) 
isn’t a form of extrapolation. We thank Marcel Weber for a discussion of this point.  
iv
 Morgan initially sought to study large-scale mutations, predicted by de Vries’s theory, 
which were presumed to be very rare. Hence large numbers were of special importance. 
v
 As a referee pointed out to us, the connection between cytology and Morgan’s work is 
important: much Drosophila work might be extrapolable to ‘chromosomal’ organisms, rather 
than just ‘sexual’ organisms. 
vi
 Steel ([2008]) calls this ‘comparative process tracing’. His book contains a rich discussion 
of extrapolation in model organisms, but focuses on responses to some of the objections to 
such extrapolations, while we are targeting the relationship between model organisms and 
theoretical models.  
vii
 They go on to note that the specific parameters might differ across different organisms. 
viii
 Wimsatt ([2000]) calls this ‘generative entrenchment’.  
ix
 A discussion of epistemic constraints on phylogenetic inference would require a paper in 
and of itself. Some philosophers sceptical of model organism work have, by our lights, 
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underestimated the role phylogeny can play here (see for instance LaFolettee & Shanks 
[1996]). Other theorists are more directly concerned with phylogenetic reconstruction (Bolker 
[1995], Santini & Stellwag [2002]). We put aside a general discussion of such issues (but see 
Steel, [2008]). 
x
 How to best conceptualize homology is contentious issue (Brigandt & Griffiths [2007]; 
Ramesey & Peterson [2012]; Hall [2003]). Here we draw on a ‘taxic’ account, which takes 
homology as an ancestral concept reliant upon systematics for epistemic access. This is 
largely for ease of exposition: the main points will fit with most other approaches. 
xi
 Some would argue that HGT undermines the very concept of well-defined lineages in the 
prokaryotic world (Franklin, [2007]). 
xii
 They are, perhaps, nearly unique to biology proper: the application of phylogenetic 
techniques to languages (Gray & Atkinson [2003]) and cultural products generally (Gray, 
Greenhill & Ross [2007]) suggest that something similar is at least possible in those domains.  
xiii
 Often results of theory-guided experimental work at one point in time, serve to facilitate 
research at a later point in time – so they are “retrospectively” preparative.  
xiv
 Kuhn uses the notion of ‘paradigm’ in several senses. We only employ one, and do so in a 
qualified way. (Bird, [2011] §3). 
xv
 It should be noted that some have argued that features particular to yeast biology have 
affected the result obtained by Ratcliff et al – but as one would expect (on the basis of our 
discussion) this is taken as telling against the theoretical significance of their results.   
xvi
 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.  
 
Captions 
 
Figure 1: Phylogenetic Inference. In the first step a character is inferred from some 
sample lineage to an ancestor of that lineage. In the second step we infer from that 
ancestor to a target lineage, or the clade in general. 
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